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Polycentrism, Self-Governance, and the Case of Married Women's Rights Reform
Originally published in Annual Proceedings of the Wealth and Well-Being of Nations
Self-enforcing constitutional constraints provide the means for individuals to discipline government actors. This paper utilizes the theory of polycentric orders as developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to analyze jurisdictional competition as one such self-enforcing constraint.
Self-enforcing constitutional constraints provide the means for individuals to discipline government actors. This paper utilizes the theory of polycentric orders as developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to analyze jurisdictional competition as one such self-enforcing constraint. The historical case study of married women’s rights reform in the 19th century is suggested as an appropriate test case for evaluating the feasibility of this mechanism as a means of preserving the self-governing nature of a society.
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